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I. INTRODUCTION

In the past two decades, copyright protection throughout the world
has been greatly expanded to respond to challenges posed by new
communications technologies and copyrightable subject matters. As
protection has increased, the growing power of copyright owners has also
led to market abuses that stifle competition and innovation. In response to
these abuses, courts, litigants, policymakers, and commentators have
increasingly embraced competition law, the doctrines of copyright misuse
and unclean hands, and tort law concepts as counter-balancing tools. This
Article discusses four different types of abuse that have occurred in the
copyright area and examines the various legal doctrines that have been
employed by Canadian and U.S. courts to resolve cases involving such
abuse.
Part II discusses the limited monopolies of copyright owners and the
various safeguards that have been built into the copyright system. Using
five recent cases-four in the United States and one in Canada-this Part
highlights the growing abuse of copyright by its owners in recent years.
Part III discusses the uneasy relationship between copyright law and the
law of monopolies. It explores four categories of abuse cases and how the
law has been applied in these cases. Part IV examines legal doctrines that
lie outside competition law but that could be used to deal with copyright
abuse. In particular, this Part discusses the doctrines of copyright misuse
and unclean hands and the claims of abuse of process and tortious
interference.
II. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND COPYRIGHT ABUSE

Copyright law grants to authors exclusive rights in their creative
works. In the case of the United States, these rights include the rights to

reproduce and distribute copyrighted works, the right to publicly perform
or display these works, the right to create derivative works, and the right to
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digitally transmit sound recordings.1 Although these rights vary from
country to country, there is a general consensus that the ultimate goal of a
copyright is to encourage the creation and dissemination of creative works,
while the immediate goal is to enable copyright owners to recoup their
investment. The U.S. Supreme Court declared in Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken: "The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
'2
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."
In addition to copyright, most countries offer moral rights protection.
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works explicitly recognizes the right of attribution and the right of
integrity.3 As the Convention states, "the author shall have the right to
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said
work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. ' 4 Although
the United States has been widely criticized for its lack of moral rights
protection, U.S. copyright law offers limited protection to moral rights in
selected works of visual arts, including paintings, drawings, prints,
sculptures, and still photographic images. 5
Notwithstanding the protection of this wide variety of rights, the
copyright system includes many built-in safeguards to maintain the
appropriate balance between exclusive control and public access.
Examples of these safeguards include the originality requirement, the ideaexpression dichotomy, durational limits of copyright, the fair dealing or fair
use privilege, the exhaustion of rights or first sale doctrine, the parody
defense, and the de minimis use exception. In light of these safeguards,
one may assume that the copyright system adequately accommodates the
public interest. One may therefore wonder whether there is any need for
courts to use legal doctrines outside the copyright system. After all,
copyright users can always rely on these internal safeguards, while
copyright owners can rarely prevent others from finding satisfactory
market substitutes.
1.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. 2007).
2.
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,156 (1975).
3.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art.
6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, revised at ParisJuly 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, 36.
4.
Id.
5.
See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000) (granting
rights of attribution and integrity to authors of works of visual art); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (Supp. 2007) (defining works of visual art).
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Although this general view is still largely correct today, the balance in
the copyright system has shifted dramatically toward copyright owners in
the past two decades. The emergence of new communications technologies
and the proliferation of new copyrightable subject matters have led to the
gradual expansion of copyright protection. The widespread use of massmarket contracts and alternative technological protection measures, along
with the newly-instituted protection against the circumvention of those
measures, has also greatly enhanced the market power of copyright
owners. 6
Unfortunately, this growing power has tempted some copyright
owners to use their exclusive rights beyond what is permissible under the
grant or beyond what is in the public interest. To reduce abuse and to
maintain the appropriate balance in the copyright system, courts and
litigants no longer rely solely on the internal safeguards mentioned above.
They increasingly have turned to legal doctrines that are external to the
copyright system, such as competition law, the doctrines of copyright
misuse and unclean hands, and other tort law concepts. To help us
understand why external tools are needed, this Part discusses five recent
cases in which the copyright owners were claimed to have abused their
exclusive rights-four in the United States and one in Canada.
Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc.
concerned the potentially overreaching agreements Disney used to license
movie trailers to website operators for use on the Internet. 7 The
agreements required licensees to keep their websites free of material
critical of Disney and the entertainment industry.8 As stated in the
relevant portion of the agreements:
The Website in which the Trailers are used may not be derogatory to
or critical of the entertainment industry or of [Disney] (and its officers,
directors, agents, employees, affiliates, divisions and subsidiaries) or of
any motion picture produced or distributed by [Disney] ... [or] of the
materials from which the Trailers were taken or of any person involved

6.
See Peter K. Yu, Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International
Intellectual Property Regime, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 73, 91-94 (Peter K. Yu ed.,
2007) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH]; Peter K.
Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13 (2006).
7.
Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 195
(3d Cir. 2003).
8.
Id. at 203.
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with the production of the Underlying Works. Any breach of this
paragraph will render this license null and void and Licensee will be
liable to all parties concerned for defamation and copyright
infringement, as well as breach of contract .... 9

Because Disney sought to use copyright law to suppress criticism, Video
Pipeline claimed that Disney had engaged in copyright misuse and
therefore should not receive protection under copyright law. 10
In United States v. Microsoft Corp., a widely-reported antitrust case,
the government contended, among other claims, that Microsoft had
illegally bundled its web browser, Internet Explorer, with its Windows
Although Microsoft did not require computer
operating system."
manufacturers to install Internet Explorer along with its licensed operating
system, it provided the browser software free of charge and included in its
license provisions that essentially prohibited the manufacturers from
Thus, although Microsoft did not
installing any other browsers.12
technically require manufacturers to install Internet Explorer, the
manufacturers' perceived need to include browsers on computers meant
that they would install Microsoft's product by default.13 The government
therefore claimed that Microsoft violated the Sherman Act by tying its
browser to the operating system in an effort to foreclose competition in the
browser market. 14
In Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., two Swarthmore students
posted an archive of internal emails among Diebold employees concerning
the flaws of its electronic voting machines. 5 Diebold, in response, sent
cease-and-desist letters to Swarthmore and other internet service providers
Under the Digital Millennium
claiming copyright infringement. 1 6
Copyright Act (DMCA), an internet service provider is shielded from
copyright infringement if it takes expedited action to remove or disable
access to allegedly infringing material.' 7 Although Swarthmore required
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Cal. 2004).
16.
17.
(2000).

Id. (quoting one of the leasing agreements).
Id.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 60-61.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1197 (N.D.
Id. at 1198.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E)
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the students to remove the email archive from their website, the students
filed suit seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief.18 The
plaintiffs also claimed that Diebold's copyright claims were "based on
knowing material misrepresentation" of copyright infringement.19 Instead
of protecting its copyright interests, Diebold was merely using the threat of
copyright litigation to prevent others from posting information to the
internet that revealed serious flaws in its electronic voting machines.
In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,

Lexmark sought an injunction against Static Control Components for
manufacturing and selling computer chips that enabled users of Lexmark
printers to use replacement toner cartridges that were not refilled and
refurbished by Lexmark. 2° In the lawsuit, Lexmark claimed that Static
Control Components unlawfully reproduced, on its chip, the Toner
Loading Program, a computer program that was designed to monitor toner
levels and report such information to the printer. 21
The printer
manufacturer also claimed the defendant violated the DMCA by
circumventing the technological measures designed to control access to
that particular program as well as another program that controlled printer
functions. 22 Although Lexmark cited copyright infringement and DMCA
violations, it clearly was not in the business of selling copyrighted
programs. Rather, it sought to use-or, more correctly, abuse-copyright
to suppress competition in the market for printer toner cartridges.
Finally, in Euro-Excellence, Inc. v. Kraft Canada, Inc., a Canadian

distributor of confectionary products sued its competitor for infringing on
the copyright in the logos affixed to its chocolate bar wrappers. 23 Kraft
held an exclusive license to import chocolate bars under the brands C6te
d'Or and Toblerone. 24 The bars were packaged in distinctive wrappers
featuring logos that were protected as copyrighted artistic works. 25 EuroExcellence, a former distributor of C6te d'Or bars, acquired the same C6te
d'Or and Toblerone bars legally in Europe and sold them in Canada. 26
18.
19.

Online Policy Group, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.
Id.

20.
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 52829 (6th Cir. 2004).
21.
22.

Id. at 529.
Id.

23.

Euro-Excellence, Inc. v. Kraft Can., Inc., [2007] S.C.C. 37, at 2 (Can.).

24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Because Kraft held an exclusive license to use the copyrighted logos in the
packaging material, Kraft sued Euro-Excellence for secondary copyright
infringement. 27 Notably, Kraft in this case did not rely on its rights as a
trademark owner. Euro-Excellence therefore defended the suit by noting
that the real purpose behind Kraft's suit was not to protect its copyrighted
works, but to protect the commercial interests that are unrelated to the
copyright.
In each of these cases, it was claimed that the copyright owner abused
the rights granted by copyright law. While the copyright owners in Video
Pipeline and Microsoft abused the rights in their effort to expand the scope
of the limited monopolies granted by copyright law, the copyright owners
in Diebold, Lexmark, and Euro-Excellence abused those rights in their
effort to gain control or advantage in areas that are unrelated or merely
incidentally related to the copyright. The ensuing Parts discuss four
different categories of copyright abuse cases and the legal doctrines that
have been employed by Canadian and U.S. courts to resolve those cases.
III. COPYRIGHT AND COMPETITION LAW

At first glance, competition law might seem to have little, if any, role
to play in the outcome of a copyright suit. In its various guises,
competition law seeks to ensure full and fair competition in the sale of
goods and services. Copyright law, however, is one area in which the
legislature has decided that ordinary competition should not exist-at least
during the copyright term. Thus, copyright, in many respects, is a grant of
a limited statutory monopoly. Unlike its treatment of other monopolists,
the law expects copyright owners to invoke the courts' assistance to protect
their exclusive rights.
This narrow focus on the copyrighted work, however, misses the
bigger picture. At its heart, copyright law does serve a procompetitive
role-not in the market for the particular book, painting, or film, but in the
larger market for ideas. 28 The law affords the author an exclusive right in
his or her own expression in order to provide a "commodity" that can be
sold in that larger market. The author's own expression, together with the
expressions created by others, will compete in this broader market for the
underlying idea.

27.
28.

Id.
See generally Thomas F. Cotter, The ProcompetitiveInterest in Intellectual
PropertyLaw, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 483 (2006).
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Once one recognizes the importance of copyright for this larger
market, it becomes clear that competition law can play a role in the
outcome of a copyright suit. In some cases, it is possible that a copyright
owner's dominant position, or acts taken by the owner to protect its rights,
will restrict or destroy competition in other markets, possibly even the
market for ideas. Under the right conditions, competition law may
intervene to preserve some degree of competition in these other markets.
A. Four Types of CopyrightAbuse
Claims of copyright abuse2 9 have arisen in a wide variety of cases.
Indeed, it seems that the potential for mischief in the use of copyright is
limited only by the copyright owner's imagination. People have alleged
abuse when a copyright owner refused to license its work,30 when it
licensed its work subject to various conditions,3 1 and when it sued or
threatened to sue for infringement.32 A complete discussion of the specific
facts of all the actual cases is well beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider the categories of cases in which
abuse claims tend to arise.
In essence, there are four types of abuse cases: (1) the use of
copyright to exact concessions from the licensee; (2) restriction of the
licensee's ability to deal with the copyright owner's competitors; (3)
dealings that limit another's ability to compete; and (4) the anticompetitive
use of the judicial system. This Part discusses in turn each of these
categories. Although categorization in such a rough form runs the risk of
overlooking the important nuances of each individual case, it provides a
29.
The terms "misuse" and "abuse" are both commonly used in case law and
legal commentaries, the former perhaps somewhat more than the latter. However, in
the United States, the term "copyright misuse" refers to the independent defense that
courts have recognized in particular situations. This Article will accordingly use the
term "copyright abuse" to describe the general issue of a party using its copyright in an
improper way and will reserve the term "copyright misuse" for the independent
defense discussed in Part IV.A.
30.
See, e.g., Dir. of Investigation & Research v. Warner Music Can. Ltd.,
[1997] 78 C.P.R.3d 321, 324 (Competition Trib.) (Can.).
31.
See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973-79 (4th Cir.
1990).
32.
See, e.g., Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195,
1197-1205 (N.D. Cal. 2004); New Era Publ'ns Int'l, ApS v. Key-Porter Books Ltd.,
[1987] 18 C.P.R.3d 562, 566 (Fed. Ct.) (Can.). In both cases, the party challenging the
threatened litigation claimed that the copyright owner was using its copyright to stifle
speech.
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useful basis for analyzing the ways in which competition law applies.
1.

Exacting Concessionsfrom the Licensee

Because copyright gives the owner the exclusive right to distribute the
protected work, a copyright owner often enjoys a favorable bargaining
position when dealing with potential buyers and licensees. If demand for
the copyrighted work is sufficiently great, the owner may be able to take
advantage of that bargaining power to exact certain legal concessions from
a licensee.33 First, and most obviously, the owner may be able to command
a higher price than it could have charged if the work were not copyrighted.
Second, the owner may insist on other non-price concessions involving the
use of the copyrighted work. For example, many software licenses allow
only for noncommercial use; others prevent the licensee from reverse
engineering the software to determine how it works. 34 Third, the owner
may even insist on non-price concessions that do not involve the
copyrighted work itself, but are nevertheless valuable to the owner. For
example, the owner may agree to license only on the condition that the
licensee keeps the terms of the agreement secret. From a competition law
perspective, each of these types of concessions presents its own unique
policy concerns.
2.

Limiting the Licensee's Ability to Deal with Competitors

One special category of concessions that copyright owners have
sought to extract from their licensees concerns the licensees' ability to deal
with the copyright owners' competitors. This category is discussed
separately here both for analytical convenience and in light of the large
number of abuse claims that fall into this category. Obviously, if a
copyright owner can ensure that a licensee buys only from the owner, its
economic position will improve. One example of such an agreement is the
exclusive supply contract, in which the licensee agrees to acquire all of a
particular type of product from the owner. Another example is the socalled "tying arrangement," in which the owner conditions its license of the
copyrighted product on the licensee's agreement to acquire a second
The copyright owner has considerably more control in the case of a
33.
license than in the case of an outright sale. Rules of property law may limit the
copyright owner's ability to control what a buyer does with the work. Cf 17 U.S.C.
§ 109 (2000) (providing that various rights comprising a copyright be exhausted when
the work is sold to another).
"Reverse engineering" is the process of disassembling a product in order
34.
to determine how the product is made or how it works.
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product in the same transaction. By linking a competitor's ability to
compete in the market for that other product, the copyright owner gains
what may be deemed an unfair advantage. 35 A variation on the tying
arrangement is the exclusive service clause, under which the licensee agrees
to use only the owner's maintenance or repair services in connection with
the copyrighted product.
3.

Limiting Another's Ability to Compete

The third line of cases involves situations in which a competitor has
entered, or would like to enter, into some sort of contract with the
copyright owner. These contracts take two basic forms. First, the
competitor may want to buy or license the owner's work for its own use. In
these cases, as in the first category, the competitor is also a potential
licensee. However, because of the competition between this potential
licensee and the owner, cases in which a competitor wants to license the
copyrighted work typically involve the copyright owner's refusal to deal,
rather than terms imposed as part of a deal. For example, a copyright
owner may refuse to sell or license copies of the work to a competitor who
wishes to compete in the market for the sale of that work.3 6 In the
alternative, the owner may refuse to sell or license the work to someone
who competes with the owner not in the market for the work, but in some
other market. Thus, if the owner sells both the copyrighted software and
the service of installing that software, the copyright owner's refusal to
license the software will limit the ability of other firms to compete in the
37
market for installation services.
A second, and equally important, subcategory involves a competitor
that enters into an agreement other than a license or sale of the copyright.
For example, multiple firms with copyrighted products may enter into an
agreement to pool their assets or divide the market among themselves.
These cases present serious opportunities for anticompetitive collusion.

35.

The massive U.S. antitrust litigation involving Microsoft concerned a

similar, but slightly different, situation. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d
34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
36.
See, e.g., Dir. of Investigation & Research v. Warner Music Can. Ltd.,
[1997] 78 C.P.R.3d 321 (Competition Trib.) (Can.) (involving a refusal to license sound
recordings to a company that wanted to compete in the sale of those recordings).
37.
Cf Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195,
1215-18 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving a refusal to license copyrighted and patented
products to an independent service organization that needed to use those products to
compete in the market for repair).
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After all, an agreement to divide up a market on geographical or other
terms is a paradigmatic competition law problem; it creates a set of
submarkets in which each seller becomes a de facto monopoly. Because
agreements among copyright owners create similar threats of increased
market concentration, the law of monopolies tends to view these
agreements critically.
4.

Anticompetitive Use of the JudicialSystem

Copyright law provides copyright owners with certain procedural
advantages in litigation. Because of these advantages, and the potential for
considerable damages in a copyright case,38 defending a copyright suit can
be daunting. Some copyright owners recognize this procedural edge and
use a lawsuit--or even the threat of a lawsuit-as a tool to control the
behavior of others. In some cases, the defendant alleges that the claims are
objectively groundless and that the copyright owner is bringing the case not
to protect its legitimate copyright interests, but to extend its rights or to
control the defendant in regards to conduct that is unrelated or only
incidentally related to the copyright.39 In others, the plaintiff's main
motive in bringing the action is to protect other, non-copyright interests
even though the defendant's conduct may technically infringe the
40
copyright.
Like those in the preceding categories, infringement suits in this
category are used abusively against potential licensees or competitors to
increase sales of the copyrighted product or to limit competition in some
other market. However, this category of abuse is distinct in the owner's
use of the judicial system to gain an advantage afforded by neither
copyright nor contract law. Although these cases are discussed here, they
may also fall into one or more of the above categories.
The four categories of cases described above are admittedly a
somewhat stylized and simplified way of approaching the issue of copyright
abuse, and some of these cases may fall into more than one category.
38.
U.S. law, for example, allows a copyright owner to opt for "statutory
damages," a fixed amount that the defendant must pay regardless of the actual harm
suffered by the copyright owner. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
39.
See, e.g., Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203
(N.D. Cal. 2004).

40.
Euro-Excellence is an example of this latter situation. Euro-Excellence
Inc. v. Kraft Can. Inc., [2007] S.C.C. 37 (Can.). In that case, plaintiff was using
copyright law to prevent the sale of goods with an identical logo, a situation ordinarily
dealt with under trademark or unfair competition laws. Id. at 2.

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 56

Nevertheless, it is very useful to conceptualize the issue in this fashion, as
each category presents its unique policy concerns, which Are often reflected
in the courts' analyses.
B. Application of the Law of Monopolies to CopyrightAbuse

The most obvious tool for dealing with copyright abuse is the law of
monopolies. In Canada, this area is called the law of "combines"; it is
governed primarily by the Competition Act. 41 In the United States, the
field is generally referred to as antitrust law and is governed mainly by the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. 42 Although these respective national laws
focus on the same basic concerns, they differ significantly in certain
particulars. As a result of these differences and in light of the highly
technical nature of the law of monopolies, this Article will provide only a
general overview of how the law affects a copyright. Readers should
consult other sources for more in-depth discussion of each particular
4
issue. 1

1.

Basic Principlesof CanadianLaw

The Canadian Competition Act is a complex statute that deals in
considerable detail with a number of different types of anticompetitive
acts. In many respects, the Act strikes a delicate balance between a seller's
need for flexibility in the ways it markets its goods and services and
society's need for free competition. Insofar as intellectual property is
concerned, however, the balance clearly favors sellers of intellectual
property at the expense of the public interest in competition and free trade.
Two provisions explicitly govern how the Competition Act applies to
copyrights, patents, and other forms of intellectual property. The basic
provision, which in some respects is the default rule, is section 79(5).
Although section 79, taken as a whole, deals with situations in which a
party abuses its dominant position in a market, subsection 5 creates a broad
exception for the enforcement of intellectual property rights. This
Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1985).
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000 & Supp. 2007); Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000).
Those interested in a more in-depth discussion of the question under
43.
Canadian law are referred to the Competition Bureau's study of intellectual property
and the Competition Act. COMPETITION BUREAU, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES (2000), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSI/ct/ipege.pdf
[hereinafter ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES]. In the United States, a good starting point
is 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.09 (2007).
41.
42.
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subsection provides:
For the purpose of this section, an act engaged in pursuant only to the
exercise of any right or enjoyment of any interest derived under the
Copyright Act, Industrial Design Act, Integrated Circuit Topography
Act, Patent Act, Trade-marks Act or any other Act of Parliament
pertaining to intellectual or industrial property is not an anticompetitive act."
This provision acknowledges the basic clash between copyright law
and the law of monopolies. Parliament has decided to give copyright
owners a certain degree of market power. Any act taken solely to protect
that privileged position cannot run afoul of the Competition Act, even if it
45
results in higher prices or limits the ability of other firms to compete.
However, if the act involves something more than the exercise of an
intellectual property right, the section 79(5) exception does not apply, and
the act may be challenged as an abuse of the intellectual property owner's
46
dominant position.
The other specific provision of the Competition Act that deals with
intellectual property is section 32, which grants the Federal Court broad
remedial power over certain types of intellectual property abuses. Section
32 provides:
(1) In any case where use has been made of the exclusive rights and
privileges conferred by one or more patents for invention, by one or
more trade-marks, by a copyright or by a registered integrated circuit
topography, so as to
(a) limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing,
manufacturing, supplying, storing or dealing in any article or
commodity that may be a subject of trade or commerce,
(b) restrain or injure, unduly, trade or commerce in relation to
any such article or commodity,
(c) prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or
production of any such article or commodity or unreasonably enhance
the price thereof, or

44.
45.

Competition Act § 79(5).
See id.

46.

See id.
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(d) prevent or lessen, unduly, competition in the production,
manufacture, purchase, barter, sale, transportation or supply of any
such article or commodity,
the Federal Court may make one or more of the orders referred to in
47
subsection (2) in the circumstances described in that subsection.
Section 32 is the "exception to the exception." As noted above,
section 79(5) provides an exception from the general "abuse of dominant
position" provisions for certain acts involving intellectual property.
Provided the act in question involves nothing more than the exercise of an
intellectual property right, it cannot be challenged under section 79.
However, that conduct can still be challenged under section 32 if it is found
48
that the conduct has an "unduly" detrimental effect on the market.
Unlike cases arising under the general provisions, section 32 cases are
heard in the Federal Court of Canada, not the Competition Tribunal.
There is little case law dealing with these provisions. 49 However, the
Competition Bureau has published a set of Intellectual Property
Enforcement Guidelines, 50 which provide a useful tool for interpreting the
Act. As interpreted by the Competition Bureau, cases involving nothing
more than the exercise of an intellectual property right include those in
which a right owner refuses to license its intellectual property to another or
in which it brings suit to enforce the right.51 These cases are governed
solely by section 32.52 However, when a party enters into some form of
contract with another involving the intellectual property, the case involves
something more than the mere exercise of an intellectual property right.53
In these latter cases, the entire Competition Act, including the "abuse of
dominant position" provisions of section 79, applies. 54 Because section 32
requires a more significant showing of market impact than do the general
provisions of the Competition Act, it is important to keep in mind when

47.
48.

Id. § 32.
Id. § 32(1).

49.
Warner Music does an excellent job of outlining the roles played by the
various provisions of the Competition Act in intellectual property cases. Dir. of
Investigation & Research v. Warner Music Can. Ltd., [1997] 78 C.P.R.3d 321
(Competition Trib.) (Can.).
50.
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 43.
51.
See id. at 7.
52.
See id.
53.
See id.
54.
See id.
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the various provisions apply.
2.

Basic Principlesof U.S. Law

Compared to its Canadian counterpart, U.S. antitrust law is a model
of brevity. Indeed, most of the law stems from two provisions that are
remarkable in both potential scope and ambiguity-namely, sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act. These provisions state in relevant part:
§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who
shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....
§ 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... 55
Most of the myriad and complex doctrines that comprise U.S.
antitrust law stem from these two simple provisions. Unlike Canadian law,
U.S. antitrust law contains no special provisions dealing with rights granted
by intellectual property law. Therefore, courts have had to weigh the
competing policies in the two legal regimes to arrive at a proper balance.
The case law is voluminous and often hard to reconcile. Fortunately, the
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), the main federal bodies responsible for enforcing
antitrust law, have weighed in on the issue of antitrust and intellectual
property on two separate occasions. In 1995, the DOJ and FTC issued a
relatively straightforward document geared primarily toward firms and
other private entities.56 In April 2007, these organizations followed up with
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (Supp. 2007). Although the Sherman Act
55.
provides for only criminal sanctions, the 1914 Clayton Act allows for private suits to
enforce federal antitrust laws. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (treble damages);
Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (injunctions).
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
56.
FOR

THE

LICENSING

OF

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

(1995),

http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf [hereinafter 1995

available at

GUIDELINES].
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a far more analytical, and much longer, report updating the state of the law
and addressing various policy concerns that have arisen.57 Taken together,
these two documents provide a relatively clear picture of how U.S. antitrust
law applies to conduct involving intellectual property; they provide
detailed analyses similar to the Enforcement Guidelines published by the
Canadian Competition Bureau.
At the outset, it is clear that the basic analysis in the United States
starts at a very different place than it does in Canada. U.S. law does not
presume that the enforcement of an intellectual property right will
ordinarily be acceptable under antitrust law. As stated in the 1995
DOJ/FTC report, "The Agencies apply the same general antitrust
principles to conduct involving intellectual property that they apply to
conduct involving any other form of tangible or intangible property. '' 58
However, this different starting point does not necessarily mean that the
propriety of any given intellectual property licensing practice will differ in
Canada and the United States. Notwithstanding the broad and seemingly
absolute language of sections 1 and 2, over the years the courts have
developed a multifaceted and nuanced approach to antitrust claims.
Most claims involving copyright abuse will be dealt with under section
2 of the Sherman Act. 59 Depending on the particular practice, courts deal
with cases arising under this section using one of two basic approaches.
Certain practices-for example, explicit price fixing, limits on output,
group boycotts, and agreements to divide a market-are deemed per se
57.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION
AND
COMPETITION
(2007),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P4OlOlPromotinglnnovationandCompetitionrp
t0704.pdf [hereinafter 2007 REPORT].

58.
1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 56, at 3. As a U.S. federal judge stated
more metaphorically, the notion that the exercise of rights provided by the copyright
cannot violate antitrust "is no more correct than the proposition that use of one's
personal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot give rise to tort liability." United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
59.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires a conspiracy. Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 2007). Only a few intellectual property licensing agreements will
involve an effort by both contracting parties to restrict trade. One example is an
agreement among intellectual property owners to fix prices or divide the market. See
Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F. Supp.
888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Some courts will also treat tying agreements under section 1,
even though only one party intends to restrain trade. See In re Wireless Tel. Servs.
Antitrust Litig., 385 F. Supp. 2d 403, 413-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that tying
agreements are prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act).
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violations. 60 All other cases involve application of the "rule of reason. 61
The difference between these two approaches is that, in "rule of reason"
cases, the court will balance the anticompetitive effects of the challenged
practice against any pro-competitive effects of the practice, as well as any
economic reasons justifying the practice. If the procompetitive effects
outweigh the anticompetitive effects, the practice does not violate antitrust
law. Virtually all cases involving allegations of copyright abuse will be
62
decided under the rule of reason.
3.

Applying the Basic Principlesto CopyrightAbuse

To determine how Canadian and U.S. laws deal with copyright abuse,
consider again the four categories of abuse discussed in Part III.A.
Although both the default rules and the wording of the statutes are
different in Canada and the United States, many of these situations will be
treated the same in both countries. Nonetheless, there are notable
differences on certain types of agreements.
a. Exacting Concessions from the Licensee. The first category of
abuse concerns the copyright owner leveraging its exclusivity to demand
various concessions from a licensee in the license agreement. These
concessions can be subdivided into three basic types: price, limits on the
use of the work, and limits on other acts. As with Part III.A, limits on the
ability to deal with the copyright owner's competitors will be discussed
separately in the next section.
Price concessions will rarely, if ever, violate either Canadian or U.S.
law. Indeed, the ability to command a higher price lies at the very core of
copyright. In order to encourage the creation of new works, the Canadian
Parliament and U.S. Congress give authors the exclusive right to control
dissemination of their works, a right that both legislatures knew would
likely result in higher prices for such works. If the law of monopolies was
invoked to deprive authors of the ability to command monopoly profits,
that law would undermine the entire copyright scheme. The only place
where the law of monopolies could play a role is the extremely rare case in
which the copyright owner has achieved an overwhelming level of
dominance in the market for works of the same genre as the copyrighted

60.
61.
62.

See 1995
Id.
See id.

GUIDELINES,

supra note 56, at 16.
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work. 63 Although Microsoft might have such dominance in the market for
operating systems, few, if any, other copyright owners will.
The second type-non-price concessions involving the use of the
work-presents fundamentally different policy concerns than price
concessions. Price concessions simply reflect the author's agreement to sell
or waive one or more of the exclusive rights granted by law. Other
concessions on use, however, involve an attempt by the copyright owner to
add to the collection of exclusive rights. In essence, the owner leverages
the demand for the copyrighted work to gain additional rights beyond
those provided by the copyright. For example, a license term preventing
the licensee from making backup copies of the software extends the
exclusive reproduction right beyond the limits set out in the copyright laws
of most jurisdictions. These laws allow software users to make backup
copies for personal use. Because these additional rights negotiated by the
copyright owner were not part of the "bargain" between society and the
underlying author, the additional rights should not necessarily be treated
the same as price concessions.
U.S. law clearly recognizes that antitrust liability may exist when a
party engages in licensing practices that increase the intellectual property
owner's exclusive rights. 64 However, all of these cases are gauged under
the rule of reason. Unless the practice has significant anticompetitive
effects, there is no antitrust liability. Moreover, recent decisions applying
the antitrust laws make it clear that the harm must be to competition as a
whole, not merely to one potential competitor. 6 Although some attempts
to augment the copyright owner's exclusive rights may have such an effect
on the market (by, say, limiting the licensee's ability to obtain substitutes),
other restrictions may not. Even if such an anticompetitive effect exists, it
may in some cases be outweighed by its procompetitive effects or by other
justifications. For example, a license provision that prevents the licensee
63.
Market dominance cannot be determined simply by sales percentages. It
is also important to consider whether there are barriers to entry in the market. Thus,
even if one firm is currently the only seller, the law of monopolies may not apply if
other firms could easily begin to compete for the same buyers. See generally ERNEST
GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 137-39 (5th ed.
2004).

64.
See 2007 REPORT, supra note 57, at 115 (recognizing that attempts to
extend a patent beyond its statutory term may subject a patent holder to antitrust
challenge); id. at 91 (recognizing that grantback provisions may do the same).
Although the 2007 Report deals only with patents, its conclusions in this regard should
apply with equal strength to copyrights.
65.
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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from using the licensed software on noncompliant computers can be
justified based on technological concerns.
Canada's position on these types of provisions appears to be the same
as that of the United States. Language in the Enforcement Guidelines
indicates that an intellectual property owner who extends the term of its
monopoly by restrictive terms in a license agreement has engaged in
66
conduct that exceeds the mere exercise of its intellectual property rights.
As a result, that license could fall outside the section 79(5) exception and
be treated as an abuse of dominant position. 67 Similarly, a party who limits
the ways in which a licensee can use the copyrighted materials may be held
liable for abusing its monopoly, because its imposition of additional
more than the exercise of the rights
restrictions also involves something
68
provided by the copyright.
Of course, even if such agreements do fall outside the protection of
section 79(5), a party challenging such a license term would have to show
an increase in the licensor's market power before a violation would be
found-an analysis basically similar to the determination of
anticompetitive effects in the United States. Thus, in neither country are
such clauses per se illegal. Instead, they are problematic only if the
copyright owner has significant market power and the restriction on the
licensee's use threatens to increase that power. In actual practice, this
degree of market power will seldom exist, especially in the realm of
copyright.
The third type of concessions-those involving matters other than the
use of the licensed copyrighted work-is not specifically addressed in any
of the government reports on the issue. Nevertheless, these cases present
some of the most interesting questions. To illustrate, consider the facts of
Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc.-the case

involving movie trailers licensed by Disney to website operators. 69 As the
court in that case recognized, there is something troubling about allowing a
copyright owner to use its intellectual property rights to stifle the speech of
66.
See ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 43, at 8.
See id. Like the 2007 Report, this language technically refers only to
67.
patents, but the logic should also apply to copyright licenses.
See id. at 19-21 (discussing how a contractual term that required buyers
68.
not to mix the patent owner's product with any other substitutes might run afoul of
section 79's "abuse of dominant position" provisions).
Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d
69.
Cir. 2003).
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others.70 And yet, such practice is likely to survive challenge under the law
of monopolies in either Canada or the United States. Unlike the second
type of license restrictions discussed above, it is difficult to see how a clause
limiting the licensee's speech about the copyright owner directly affects
competition.
The licensee's use of the product itself remains
unconstrained. Moreover, the licensee remains free-both legally and
economically-to purchase competing goods from other sellers. Although
there may be an incidental effect on the market for the copyright owner's
product due to reduced criticism, it is unlikely to rise to the level of having
a significant effect on market power or competition.71
b. Limiting the Licensee's Ability to Deal with Competitors. In the

second category, the copyright owner has licensed its copyright to a
licensee, but included in that agreement terms that, as a legal or practical
matter, make it more difficult for the licensee to deal with others. One
example of such an agreement is the exclusive source license, in which the
licensee agrees to purchase all of its product from the copyright owner.
Another is the so-called "tying arrangement," in which the copyright owner
insists that the licensee acquire not only the high-demand copyrighted
product, but also another product for which there is less demand.72 In both
cases, the licensee has little incentive to acquire products from the
copyright owner's competitors. Thus, both cases present implications for
competition law.
Both Canada and the United States will analyze these types of
agreements in terms of their effect on the market power of the copyright
owner and its competitors. To illustrate the basics of this analysis, consider
a hypothetical tying arrangement. A copyright owner holds the copyright
in certain backup software. However, it only sells this software preloaded
onto a portable hard drive. Thus, in order to acquire the software, the
purchaser must also buy the owner's hard drive. The effect of such a
70.
See id. at 205-06.
71.
The court in Video Pipeline dealt with the case not under antitrust law,
but instead under the U.S. doctrine of copyright misuse. As Part IV.A will discuss, that
doctrine does not require a showing of harm to competition. However, the court
ultimately found that a limitation on the licensee's ability to make negative statements
on its website was not misuse because there were adequate, alternate channels of
communication available to the licensees. Id. at 206.
72.
Of course, as these cases involve contractual limitations on the licensee,
they are facially similar to cases in the first category. Unlike cases in that category,
which mainly affect only the copyright owner and the licensee, those in this second
category have a direct impact on competitors.
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provision is to limit the competition in the market for portable hard drives,
73
a market in which the copyright owner does not have significant control.
In Canada, because the license term involves something more than
the mere exercise of the rights provided by the copyright, it could be
challenged as an abuse of dominant position under section 79 of the
Competition Act.74 The Competition Tribunal would evaluate whether the
copyright owner had substantial market power. 75 Note that in these cases
the relevant market is the market for the tying product (the software), not
the market for portable hard drives. If market power exists, the Tribunal
would then consider whether tying the company's hard drive to the
software threatened to prevent or lessen competition in the market for
portable hard drives. 76 Meeting these elements makes a core case for
abuse. However, the company would not be held liable if it was
determined that the company's dominant position was achieved mainly due
to the superiority of its product or service, 77 or that technological
considerations justified the requirement that software users use only one
78
particular model of hard drive.
The analysis in the United States would involve a modified version of
the "rule of reason" analysis. 79 As in Canada, there is no liability unless
the copyright owner has market power in the market for the tying product
(again, the software). If the owner has sufficient power in that marketthat is, if the demand for its software is high enough-to allow it to restrain

73.
It may be that the copyright owner also has a patent on its model of
portable hard drive. That fact alone would not give the owner market power. Instead,
one would have to consider how many alternative versions of hard drives were

available for purchase.
74.

See Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 79 (1985).

75.
See ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 43, at 6.
76.
See Competition Act § 79(1)(c). This standard of "lessening competition"
is not as rigorous as a requirement that the owner have established market power in
the market for hard drives.
77.
See id. § 79(4).
78.
See ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 43, at 20-21.
79.
The United States used to apply a strict per se rule to tying arrangements.
Indeed, earlier cases applied this standard to hold that tying arrangements involving
films and sound recordings violated the antitrust laws. See United States v. Loew's
Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 39, 44-45 (1962) (films); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of
Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 888, 890, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (music
compositions synchronized on films). Today, however, considerations of market power
are relevant. See 2007 REPORT, supra note 57, at 105-06. In true per se cases, by

contrast, courts do not consider market power. Id.
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trade in the market for portable hard drives, a court would then determine
whether the tie might affect a "not insubstantial" amount of trade in the
market for the hard drives.8 0 In essence, the analysis proceeds along the
same lines in both countries.
c. Limiting Another's Ability to Compete. The third category
involves situations in which the copyright owner deals with an actual or
potential competitor. Such agreements are immediately suspect under the
laws of monopolies in both Canada and the United States because of the
potential risk of reduced competition in the market. As one may imagine,
the studies published by the Canadian Competition Bureau and the
DOJ/FTC discuss these issues in great depth.
There are two subcategories of these cases, as discussed in Part III.A.
The first, and most common, subcategory is the outright refusal to deal.
On this issue, the Canadian and U.S. views are almost identical: in the
words of the agencies, it is extremely "rare" for an intellectual property
owner's refusal to license or sell to a competitor to violate the laws of
monopolies."1 Simply put, one is ordinarily under no duty to help out a
competitor, even though one has a legal advantage stemming from the
grant of an intellectual property right. The rare exception, which is similar
in both countries, will prove to be even rarer in cases of copyright
monopolies.
In Canada, cases involving a unilateral refusal to deal will be resolved
under section 32 of the Competition Act. Because the right to distributeor to choose not to distribute-is one of the core rights granted to the
copyright owner, any refusal to deal involves nothing more than the
exercise of the rights provided by the copyright. As a result, section 79(5)
makes it clear that such refusal cannot qualify as an abuse of dominant
position. Section 32 still allows for liability, but only if the refusal to deal
unduly affects certain aspects of competition.
The Competition Bureau has prescribed a three-part analysis
concerning when refusals to deal are actionable under section 32 of the
Competition Act. s2 First, the owner of the intellectual property right must
80.
81.

See 2007 REPORT, supra note 57, at 105-06.
See id. at 27 (stating that antitrust liability for refusing to assist a

competitor "is a rare exception to the ordinary rules of antitrust"); ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES, supra note 43, at 9 (stating that "only in very rare circumstances" would
an antitrust violation exist).
82.
See ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 43, at 9.
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be "dominant in the relevant market."83 It is important to note that the
relevant market is not the market for the sale of the owner's intellectual
property, but instead the market for some affiliated good or service.
Second, the intellectual property the owner refuses to license must be "an
essential input or resource for firms [that want to compete] in the relevant
market." 4 Even if both of these factors are met, a federal court will not
necessarily grant relief. Instead, relief is warranted only if the refusal to
license is stifling innovation in the relevant market. This final factor
recognizes that, in some cases, a refusal to license the accepted technology
will encourage others to develop competing technologies.8 5
This three-part test will rarely be satisfied in copyright cases. First,
very few copyright owners have dominance in markets other than the
market for their copyrighted product. 86 The Competition Bureau almost
never concerns itself with conduct by a firm that has a market share of less
than thirty-five percent. 87 Second, and more importantly, copyrighted
works are rarely an "input or resource" for firms wanting to compete in
another market. 88 The only notable exception is in what the Bureau dubs a
"network industry"-a special situation in which there is a high degree of
standardization by law or custom and in which intellectual property serves
as an essential resource. 89 For example, if everyone in a particular market
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
See id.
86.
See id. at 12 ("In general, the more firms there are in the relevant market,
the less likely it is that any one firm acting unilaterally.., could enhance or maintain
market power through the transaction or conduct being examined.").
87.
See id.
88.
This problem has existed for many years in the area of patent law.
Because advanced technology often turns on the use of certain resources and
components, companies often try to obtain "blocking patents" on those constituent
technologies. See id. at 22 (discussing how a firm may invent around the blocking
patent or enter into a licensing agreement with the firm to use the blocked technology).
In contrast, the problem is of fairly recent vintage in the field of copyright. Unlike
technology, copyrighted works typically are not "resources" that are incorporated into
other works. Historically, a party rarely needed to copy one copyrighted work to
compete effectively in the market for some other type of work. However, the
extension of copyright protection to computer technology has changed this to some
extent and created a similar problem of "blocking copyrights." See generally Mark A.
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REV.
989, 1075-77 (1997) (proposing a rule of "blocking copyrights").
89.
See ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 43, at 9. Recent lower court
decisions in the United States apply the doctrine only if the item in question is truly
essential. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544-46
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needs to use files that are compatible with Microsoft's newest operating
system, that particular market might qualify as one involving a network
industry. Although network industries are more common-yet still
relatively rare-with respect to patented products, few copyright cases will
present such a situation. 90
The United States also starts from the premise that a company has an
unrestricted right to refuse to deal, even if it enjoys a statutory monopoly
such as a copyright. 91 Although a handful of recent decisions have cast
some slight doubt on this rule, 92 it nevertheless appears that the basic
(9th Cir. 1991). If there are substitutes-even though those substitutes are inferior or
more costly-the doctrine does not apply. See id. at 542-46.
90.
The Competition Tribunal had occasion to apply this basic analysis in the
Warner Music case. Dir. of Investigation & Research v. Warner Music Can., Ltd.,
[1997] 78 C.P.R. 3d 321 (Competition Trib.) (Can.). In that case, Warner Music held
the copyrights in many popular recordings and distributed those recordings itself and
also through a mail order business that it operated in partnership with another
company. Id. at 324-25. BMG, which wanted to operate a competing mail order
business, tried to negotiate a license for the more popular recordings. Id. at 325.
Warner refused to license the operation. Id. The Tribunal held that such refusal fell
squarely within the section 79(5) exception, as the copyright owner was doing nothing
more than exercising its right not to distribute. Id. at 332. Any remedy, the Tribunal
indicated, would have to lie under section 32 of the Competition Act. Id. at 331.
Because section 32 is administered by the Federal Court, not the Tribunal, the Tribunal
did not address section 32. Id. at 331-32. In In re Independent Service Organizations
Antitrust Litigation, a number of independent service organizations complained about a
company's refusal either to sell patented replacement parts or to license its patented
and copyrighted software. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 2000). The organizations argued that without that software, they could not
compete in the market for servicing the company's products. Id. The court rejected
the antitrust claim, reasoning that the right to exclude others lies at the core of a
patentee's rights and thus is not an antitrust violation unless there is illegal tying, fraud,
or sham litigation. Id, at 1327-28.
91.
In the patent area, the picture in the United States is somewhat
complicated by section 271(d)(4) of the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2000).
Added in 1988, this provision states that a refusal to license a patented invention
cannot by itself be deemed patent abuse. Id. There is some debate as to whether this
provision is immunized from the antitrust laws. Regardless of whether such an
exception exists in patent law, there is no similar provision applicable to a refusal to
license a copyright.
92.
For one example of a U.S. Supreme Court decision that has caused some
confusion see Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
Aspen Skiing concerned real property, not copyrights or patents. However, the tone of
the decision has raised some doubt as -to whether there is an absolute right to refuse to
deal. It appears to suggest that the right to refuse to deal is not absolute, but instead is
subject to a rule of economic rationality. More directly on point is the Ninth Circuit's
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principle is at least as firm in the United States as it is in Canada. The 2007
DOJ/FTC Report strongly suggests that the intellectual property owner's
right to refuse to license will generally not be challenged, even though it
may hinder competition.9 3 The recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP appears to
94
support this conclusion.
As in Canada, however, the intellectual property owner's rights are
not absolute, and a refusal to deal may be actionable when the intellectual
property right operates as a "bottleneck." Sometimes called the "essential
facilities" doctrine, this analysis proceeds along largely the same lines as
the analysis under section 32 of the Canadian Competition Act. 95 To prove
a bottleneck, the challenger must show "(1) control of the essential facility
by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to
duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a
competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility." 96 Note that
factor two will always be met in the case of intellectual property because
only the owner has the legal right to use the copyright or patent. Even if
these four factors97are met, the refusal may be justified if supported by valid
business reasons.
Admittedly, considerable debate surrounds the bottleneck doctrine, 98
which, in essence, is the functional equivalent of the Canadian section 32
decision in Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., which held that a

company's refusal to sell patented spare parts to companies that wanted to service its
products violated the antitrust laws due to Kodak's desire to monopolize the service
market. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.
1997). Although Kodak involves intellectual property, it has been roundly criticized

and probably does not accurately reflect the law.
93.
See 2007 REPORT, supra note 57, at 27-31.
94.
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398 (2004). The Court in this case indicated that it had "been very cautious" in finding
exceptions to the general principle that a party could refuse to deal, because such
refusals could often be justified in economic terms. Id. at 408.
95.
See ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 43, at 9.
96.
MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th
Cir. 1983).
97.
This additional element stems from the Aspen case discussed above. See
GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 63, at 180 ("[A] monopolist has a right to refuse to deal
'only if there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal."' (quoting Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 n.32 (1992))).
98.
In Trinko, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that it had "never recognized"
the doctrine. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410-11. The doctrine has also been criticized in the
literature.
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test discussed above. For now, though, the lower courts in the United
States continue to apply it. 9 Under both Canadian and U.S. laws, the only
situation in which a refusal to deal has antitrust implications occurs when
the intellectual property owner leverages its exclusive rights in one market
to improve its competitive edge in some other market.
This
interrelationship in markets, as noted above, will apply only in what the
Competition Bureau calls a network industry.
The other type of cases involving copyright owners and competitors is
comprised of those situations in which the parties enter into a deal other
than a licensing agreement. These cases are in many respects the easiest of
all because the anticompetitive nature of the agreement is often the most
obvious. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference in the way Canadian
and U.S. laws deal with many of these cases.
In the United States, many agreements between competitors that do
not involve licensing will fall under the per se analysis. In per se cases,
antitrust liability exists even if there is no evidence of anticompetitive
effects. Thus, if various owners-of copyrights in sound recordings or films
enter into an agreement to divide up the market or fix prices, they will
automatically be found liable for an antitrust violation. 100
In Canada, by contrast, such agreements will typically be dealt with
under section 45 of the Competition Act, which governs conspiracies and
other agreements that restrict trade. Section 45 incorporates a rule similar
to the U.S. rule of reason, providing a remedy only in cases of significant
market power and acts that reduce competition in that market.101 To
illustrate, consider again the example of various recording or movie
companies that enter into an agreement to fix prices for their copyrighted
goods. While in the United States such an agreement is per se invalid, in
Canada the government will act only if the parties have significant market
99.
See, e.g., Gregory v. Fort Bridger Rendezvous Ass'n, 448 F.3d 1195, 1204
(10th Cir. 2006); City of Maiden v. Union Elec. Co., 887 F.2d 157, 160 (8th Cir. 1989);
Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 456, 460-61 (E.D. Pa. 1996);
TCA Bldg. Co. v. Nw. Res. Co., 873 F. Supp. 29, 39 (S.D. Tex 1995).
100.
See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (holding that block
booking of copyrighted motion pictures for television exhibition violated antitrust
laws); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F.
Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (holding that ASCAP's practices of withholding the right to
perform compositions for profit in motion pictures and requiring exhibitors to pay
annual blanket licensing fees violated antitrust laws); 1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 56,
at 16.
101.
See Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 45 (1985).
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power and the agreement threatens to augment that power.'02 Moreover,
unlike U.S. law, Canadian law places considerable significance on the
parties' intent to increase market share. 10 3
d. Anticompetitive Use of the Judicial System. Like the copyright
owners in the three categories of cases mentioned above, the copyright
owner in this category is taking what might be deemed to be unfair
advantage of the rights granted by the copyright. In this situation,
however, the owner is asserting those rights before a judicial tribunal. The
focus of the concern, therefore, is somewhat different in this category than
in the others. In addition to the concern about market power, these cases
raise the issue of whether a party should be able to make use of the courts
when its motive is not primarily to protect its existing rights but instead to
enhance its competitive position.
Both Canada and the United States recognize the competition
implications of copyright claims. But only the United States deals with
these situations under the law of monopolies.'0
The Canadian
Competition Bureau has taken the position that assertions of intellectual
property rights-whether they involve spurious claims or proper claims
brought for improper reasons-are matters for courts and intellectual
property authorities, not for the application of the Competition Act. 10 5 In
the United States, by contrast, claims may violate section 2 of the Sherman
10 6
Act, provided that all of the elements of a section 2 violation are met.
To demonstrate such a violation, it is necessary to show that the firm
bringing the claim has market power and that the act in question threatens

102.
See ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 43, at 16-17 (analyzing a
hypothetical price-fixing conspiracy under section 45 of the Competition Act).
103.
See Competition Act §§ 103.3(2)(c), 104.1(1)(b)(ii).
104.
See, e.g., Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1993) (recognizing that a "sham" copyright suit can result in
antitrust liability even though the court found that the suit involved in this particular
case was not a sham); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984)
(imposing antitrust liability on a bad faith patent suit).
105.
See ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 43, at 10, 16.
106.
See 1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 56, at 32. The Federal Trade
Commission has also indicated that spurious suits could violate section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, which allows the FTC to challenge "unfair" and "deceptive"
methods of competition. Id. In both cases, it would be necessary to demonstrate that
the party bringing the action or making the threat knew, or had reason to know, that
the claim was groundless. Id.
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to decrease competition. 10 7 If those factors are satisfied, it would seem
impossible for a party to be able to offer proof of any procompetitive
reasons for bringing a false claim. 0 8 The difference between the Canadian
and U.S. views boils down to the question of whether criminal sanctions
ought to be available as a deterrent to parties who would use the courts to
augment their market power.
4.

Remedies Under the Law of Monopolies

As demonstrated above, in some situations the law of monopolies will
apply to acts taken by a copyright owner that have a significant effect on
the market. However, certain aspects of the law of monopolies have
limited its usefulness to the party being subjected to copyright abuse. First,
the victim of abuse needs to initiate the claim, either with a government
agency (as in Canada) or with a court. Second, although the law of
monopolies may be a good sword, it is not a particularly effective shield. In
other words, while the law gives the victim some authority to challenge the
acts of a copyright owner and to obtain compensation or some other
remedy, it does not necessarily go to the root of the problem-abuse of the
underlying intellectual property right. Violation of the law of monopolies
is not a defense to a copyright infringement claim. Nor can the victim use
that law to have the copyright declared invalid. 109
Moreover, many parties who have been subjected to copyright abuse
do not want to take the time and trouble to invoke the Draconian law of
monopolies, which often results in drastic penalties. These parties instead
107.
See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (delineating the elements of a section 2 violation).
108.
Nor would the party be protected by Noerr-Penningtonimmunity. Under
that doctrine, a party cannot be held liable under the antitrust laws for seeking the
assistance of government, even if it does so to restrict competition. United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The doctrine evolved in
cases in which a party sought legislative change, but has since been extended to the use
of courts. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 43, § 13.09[A][1][c]. However, NoerrPennington immunity does not apply to purely sham activity. Id. Thus, a party who
brought a baseless infringement action that violated section 2 would not be immune
from liability. Id.
109.
There may be rare exceptions to this rule in Canada. Section 32 of the
Competition Act gives the Federal Court of Canada authority to issue a "special
remedy" in situations in which the exercise of an intellectual property right harms
competition. The Competition Bureau has indicated that this special remedy could, in
certain cases, involve revocation of the intellectual property right. ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES, supra note 43, at 4.
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prefer a more precise remedy: either cancellation or suspension of the
copyright or a defense to an infringement claim while the abuse continues.
Because the law of monopolies does not ordinarily provide this sort of
relief, parties have on occasion turned to other legal principles.
IV. APPLICATION OF OTHER LAWS TO COPYRIGHT ABUSE

The law of monopolies tends to focus on the "big picture." In both
Canada and the United States, competition laws usually provide a remedy
only in cases in which there is significant harm to the market as a whole.
As such, they are not necessarily of much use to individual players in the
market who have suffered harm that is quite serious to them but that has
little effect on overall competition. Coupled with the limits on remedies
discussed above, this focus on the market as a whole severely restricts the
role of the law of monopolies in policing copyright abuse.
Because of these problems, it should be no surprise that parties who
have been subjected to copyright abuse have sought relief under other
laws. The most obvious place to look, of course, would be copyright law
itself. However, copyright law is conspicuously silent on copyright abuse.
Both Canadian and U.S. laws freely provide copyright owners with an
impressive array of rights and limits on those rights, but these laws rarely
deal with the question of when it might be improper for a copyright owner
to use these rights in ways that affect competition." 0 Parties have
accordingly been forced to look to rules outside the intellectual property
area.
This Part explores three distinct claims that parties have made in an
attempt to deal with alleged copyright abuse. Most of the attempts have
occurred in the United States. Moreover, as will be demonstrated, each of
the legal theories has its problems. Nevertheless, the developments offer
potential ways to alleviate select types of copyright abuse.
A. Copyright Misuse
This Article uses the term "copyright abuse" to describe any situation
in which a copyright owner uses its rights in an improper way. In the
United States, however, there is also a growing discussion of "copyright
misuse." Unlike the generic term "abuse," copyright misuse is a specific
110.
The rare exception is 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2000), which provides an action
for damages against any party "who knowingly materially misrepresent[ed]" that
another party infringed its rights under the DMCA. These types of provisions are
fairly rare.
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defense-separate from, and independent of, antitrust law-that a party
may invoke when a copyright owner uses its rights in a competitionrestricting fashion. Although the doctrine's exact parameters are not
entirely clear, there is increasing acceptance of the basic premise.11'
U.S. courts have long recognized an independent doctrine of patent
misuse. 112 The doctrine provides a defense to patent infringement in cases
in which the patentee has misused its statutory rights. 113
Yet,
notwithstanding the similarity between patents and copyrights, it took
some time for courts to apply similar principles in the field of copyright.
The breakthrough came in the 1990 decision of Lasercomb America, Inc. v.
Reynolds.1 4 In that case, the Fourth Circuit engaged in an exhaustive
review of the development of the doctrine of patent misuse in both
England and the United States. 5 Because patent and copyright laws serve
similar purposes, the court held that patent misuse principles ought to
apply with equal force in a copyright case. 116
Of course, misuse is a very broad term. In addition to finding a
logical home for the doctrine of copyright misuse, Lasercomb helps to
define when misuse exists. The facts of that case are illustrative. A
copyright owner licensed its software to others. 117 The license agreement
contained a term that forbade the licensee from developing any other
software that would compete with the licensed software.' l The court held
that the clause constituted misuse because it constituted use of the
copyright "in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant
of a copyright."1 19 Copyright law distinguishes between protectible
expressions and the unprotectible ideas underlying those expressions. 1 0
Although copyright law gave the owner the right to protect against copying
of its particular expression, it did not grant any right to limit the

111.

See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1102-03

(N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating that in recent years courts have been more willing to
recognize the copyright misuse defense).
112.
See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 975-76 (4th Cir. 1990)
(discussing the history of the patent misuse defense).

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 976.
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 974-76.
Id. at 976-77.
Id. at 971.
Id. at 978.
Id.

120.

See id. at 978-79.
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development of competing expressions of the underlying idea. 121 Because
the license term was an attempt to limit those expressions, the court held
that the copyright owner was barred from suing the licensee for breaching
22
the license restriction.1
On the surface, Lasercomb looks much like an antitrust case. When
one digs deeper, however, there are several important differences between
the doctrine of copyright misuse and the antitrust law doctrines discussed
earlier. First, and most practically, the remedy is different. Whereas
antitrust law affords a party the right to bring an action to challenge
anticompetitive acts, copyright misuse is a defense to an infringement
claim. That defense exists as long as the misuse continues. 123 Thus, rather
than forcing the victim of infringement to take the time and trouble to
challenge the license provision, the doctrine of copyright misuse allows the
victim to wait until he is being sued.
Second, there is a subtle, but important, difference in the types of
conduct that constitute copyright misuse and the types that violate antitrust
law. As discussed above, antitrust law focuses on large-scale disruptions in
competition. The policies underlying copyright misuse, by contrast, stem
from copyright, not competition, law. 124 The copyright owner's acts in
Lasercomb constituted misuse because they were an attempt to evade one
of the limits that Congress placed on a copyright owner's rights: the ideaexpression dichotomy.1 25 Admittedly, those acts might also prove to be
anticompetitive, but general market considerations are secondary. Thus, in
theory, any act by which a copyright owner attempts to expand its rights
beyond the limits imposed by the Copyright Act could constitute misuse.
That second difference leads directly to a third. Copyright misuse, as
envisioned by Lasercomb, clearly exists as a separate and independent
alternative to the antitrust laws.126 Note that the trial court in Lasercomb
found that the license did not violate the antitrust laws. 27 The Fourth
Id. at 978.
122.
Id. at 978-79.
123.
The Lasercomb court explicitly noted that the doctrine was a defense to
an infringement claim, not an invalidation of the underlying copyright. Id. at 979 n.22.
124.
See id. at 973 ("[A] misuse of copyright defense is inherent in the law of
copyright just as a misuse of patent defense is inherent in patent law.").
125.
See id. at 978-79.
126.
See id. at 979 ("[Tlhe analysis necessary to a finding of [copyright] misuse
is similar to but separate from the analysis necessary to a finding of antitrust
violation.").
127.
Id. at 977. The trial court found the license did not necessarily have an
121.
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Circuit rejected this approach, holding that it was irrelevant whether the
agreement might have violated the antitrust laws. 128 Because the
considerations underlying the doctrine of copyright misuse are separate
from those underlying antitrust, the court found that the lower court erred
in importing concepts such as the rule of reason from the antitrust laws.129
Thus, conduct may constitute copyright misuse even if it does not violate
the antitrust laws.
In sum, the independent doctrine of copyright misuse provides a
useful alternative to the law of monopolies. It focuses on whether the
owner is attempting to avoid some limit imposed by copyright law.
Although many such acts will also have some anticompetitive effect, a
finding of significant effect is not a necessary element of the claim. Thus,
copyright misuse will apply in many cases in which the law of monopolies
would not reach. On the other hand, the penalty for copyright misuse is far
less drastic. Rather than criminal penalties or treble damages under U.S.
antitrust law, the sole penalty for copyright misuse is the inability to sue for
infringement. That penalty exists only as long as the misuse continues.
In recent years, there has been growing acceptance of the copyright
misuse doctrine in the United States, even though the Supreme Court and
a number of circuits have yet to rule on the issue. 130 Canadian courts, by
contrast, have given the doctrine a considerably cooler reception. In fact,
one could argue that the Canadian Supreme Court has completely rejected
the misuse doctrine in Euro-Excellence, which concerned the use of
copyright to combat parallel importation.'
Although Justice Michel
Bastarache, along with Justices Louis LeBel and Louise Charron, stated
that the Copyright Act should be read in pari materia with the Trade-marks
Act and that the plaintiff's act of filing the copyright claim constituted
copyright abuse, 13 2 he found the doctrine unnecessary in the parallel

effect on the broad market for this type of software because it only prevented the
licensees from developing, not buying, competing products. See id. at 978. The main
harm occasioned by the clause was to the licensees, not to the market as a whole. See
id. Moreover, the trial court found that the clause could be justified under the rule of
reason because there were significant business justifications for such a provision. See
id. at 977.
128.
Id. at 978.
129.
See id. at 977-78.
130.
See Brett Frischmann & Daniel Moylan, The Evolving Doctrine of
Copyright Misuse, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH, supra
note 6, at 269, 280-290; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 43, § 13.09[A][2][b].
131.
Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Can. Inc., [2007] S.C.C. 37 (Can.).
132.
Id. IT 83-86.
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importation context and "best left for another day" the determination of
the doctrine's possible application in Canada.'33 Meanwhile, Justice
Marshall Rothstein, joined by Justices Ian Binnie and Marie Deschamps,
went a step further to explicitly declare the lack of support in Canadian law
for a doctrine of copyright misuse. 34 Justice Morris Fish also agreed with
Justice Rothstein, although he expressed "grave doubt" as to "whether the
law governing the protection of intellectual property rights in Canada can
be transformed in this way into an instrument of trade control not
contemplated by the Copyright Act."'' s Thus, although the Court's
reasoning is confined to the particular, and somewhat peculiar,
circumstances of the case, there seems to be very little, if any, support
within the Canadian Supreme Court for an independent doctrine of
copyright misuse in Canada.
B. The Doctrineof Unclean Hands
The doctrine of "unclean hands" is a traditional defense available in
actions in equity. It applies when the party bringing suit has engaged in
certain questionable conduct in connection with the action and when the
conduct is sufficiently egregious to warrant the denial of relief. 136 A few
U.S. courts have invoked the doctrine as a defense in copyright
137
infringement actions.
At first glance, the doctrine of unclean hands might appear to have a
significant potential for dealing with copyright abuse. Like "abuse,"
"unclean hands" is a flexible term that could, in theory, reach many
different types of conduct. Although the doctrine requires that the conduct
in question directly involve the subject matter of the suit, most abuse
claims stem out of the copyright that is the basis of the infringement action
or that is the subject of a license agreement. Like the independent claim of
copyright misuse, the remedy in a case of unclean hands-denying the
party the right to sue while the objectionable conduct continues-is far less
drastic than invalidating the copyright or exposing the party to sanctions
133.
Id. [98.
134.
Id.
7-13.
135.
Id. 56.
136.
Traditionally, the doctrine only applied when a party sought equitable
relief, such as an injunction. However, U.S. courts apply equitable defenses, such as
unclean hands, in all intellectual property actions, regardless of the form of relief
sought.
137.
See, e.g., QAD, Inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (N.D.
Ill. 1991).
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under the law of monopolies.
To date, however, the doctrine of unclean hands has not realized its
potential. Its use seems to be limited mainly to U.S. courts. Moreover,
those courts have applied it only rarely, and even then only in one
particular category of abuse-cases involving objectively groundless
actions. The "unclean hands" in those cases almost always involve some
form of fraud, such as misrepresenting to the court or the other party the
extent of one's rights or falsifying evidence. Courts rarely apply the
doctrine of unclean hands in situations falling in the other three categories
of abuse.
C. Abuse of Process

On occasions, parties have also tried to invoke other traditional tort
law concepts to deal with alleged copyright abuse. In situations involving
spurious lawsuits, defendants have sometimes charged that the case
involves abuse of process. However, courts have not been particularly
responsive to these sorts of allegations. A party does not abuse the judicial
process merely by bringing a weak claim in its good-faith attempt to protect
rights provided by the copyright. Instead, a party abuses the process only
when it uses the courts to accomplish tangential goals unrelated to the
subject matter of the lawsuit. Thus, a groundless copyright claim does not
itself constitute abuse, even if the party bringing the action knew the suit
was very likely to fail. Instead, abuse exists only if the party's motive was
to gain some advantage that was unrelated to its copyright.
The limitations on the action for abuse are perhaps best illustrated by
the Canadian decision of New Era PublicationsInternational,ApS v. Key-

PorterBooks Ltd.13 8 New Era, a publisher, had obtained exclusive rights to
publish the works of the controversial religious leader and author L. Ron
Hubbard.139 These rights were apparently quite valuable.140 One of the
defendants obtained copies of thousands of documents produced by
Hubbard.141 Quoting extensively from these documents, that individual
wrote a book highly critical of Hubbard. 142 New Era sued, claiming the
documents were obtained illegally and the use of major passages infringed
138.
562 (Can.).
139.
140.

New Era Publ'ns Int'l ApS v. Key-Porter Books Ltd., [1987] 18 C.P.R.3d
Id. 13.
See id. 3.

141.

Id. $T 6-8.

142.

Id. $ 8.
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its rights in Hubbard's works. 143 The individual claimed that New Era was
attempting to use its copyright to squelch critical speech.'" The court
145
ultimately dismissed New Era's claim on purely procedural grounds.
However, it also rejected the defendants' claim that the case constituted
abuse of process. 146 The publisher's decision to protect its "very valuable
copyright," the court47 reasoned, could not be an improper basis to invoke
the judicial process.1
D. Tortious Interference
A potentially more far-reaching claim is tortious interference.
Although historically this tort was limited to situations in which one party
interfered with another's contract, it has, in recent years, been extendedwith significant limitations-to the situation in which a party interferes with
another's ongoing business relationships. 148 Many acts that fall under the
general heading of copyright abuse could also be analyzed as situations in
which a party wrongfully interferes with a competitor's business. For
example, when a copyright owner forbids a licensee from dealing with the
owner's competitors, or imposes a tying arrangement on the licensee, the
owner has arguably prevented the licensee from forming a business
relationship with the owner's competitors.
One possible reason for the lack of interest in using tortious
interference is that the remedy is limited. Like the law of monopolies,
tortious inference can only be used by a party who wants to affirmatively
challenge the actions of a copyright owner. It would not afford the same
party a defense in an infringement action or invalidate the copyright.
Parties charged with copyright infringement may well find themselves
faced with more pressing concerns. Therefore, they do not bother seeking
tort remedies.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. 1 13.
Id. TT 15-18.
Id. TT 20-26.
See id. 9129.
Id. Although the Canadian Supreme Court's recent Euro-Excellence

decision did not involve a claim for abuse of process, precedent like New Era

Publications suggests that the Supreme Court would similarly have rejected such a
claim had it been presented.
In the United States, compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766A
148.
(1979) (interference with contract), with id. § 767 (interference with prospective
contractual relationship).
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V. CONCLUSION

This Article deals with the evolving concept of copyright abuse.
Although a copyright provides owners with an array of powerful rights,
those rights are limited. Copyright law places important limits on a
copyright owner's ability to deal with others. Other laws may also limit the
owner's rights, especially in situations in which the owner tries to leverage
the rights provided by the copyright into a more powerful competitive
position.
To date, the main avenue for dealing with copyright abuse in both
Canada and the United States has been the law of monopolies (the
Canadian Competition Act and the U.S. antitrust laws). In the proper
case, these laws can provide a valuable tool for dealing with
anticompetitive uses of copyright power. However, the law of monopolies
is not always an adequate solution to the problem. It paints with too broad
a brush, focusing on the market as a whole rather than on individual actors
within that market. Moreover, the penalties for violating the Competition
Act or the U.S. antitrust laws are often far too drastic. Therefore, courts,
especially those in the United States, have begun to explore other ways to
deal with copyright abuse. Whether this exploration will ultimately bear
fruit and whether any lessons learned in the United States can ultimately
be exported to other countries remain to be seen.

